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ARTICLES
FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE: "REVERSE
BAD FAITH" IN FIRST-PARTY
LITIGATION INVOLVING ARSON
AND INSURANCE FRAUD
CATHRYN M. LITrLEt
In the context of first-party insurance litigation, the concept
of "reverse bad faith" refers to a cause of action allowing an
insurer to assert a counterclaim for affirmative relief against an
insured who brings a frivolous, bad faith action.1 Bad faith litigia-
tion by an insured against an insurer has long been recognized
under certian circumstances.2 For example, a bad faith refusal by
an insurer to provide insurance coverage or to pay a justifiable
claim may give rise to a claim for punitive damages.3 In general,
t Cathryn M. Little, practices in Raleigh, North Carolina, in insurance
defense litigation, with an emphasis on arson and fraud. Thomas M. Morrow, a
third year law student at Wake Forest University School of Law, assisted with
the research for this article.
1. See, e.g., Von Hagel v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 91 N.C. App. 58, 370
S.E.2d 695 (1988). See also Chris M. Kallianos, Comment, Bad Faith Refusal to
Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing Recognition of Extra-Contract
Damages, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1421 (1986).
2. See supra note 1.
3. In North Carolina, although punitive damages are generally not
recoverable for breach of contract, except for a breach of a contract to marry,
Miller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 295, 306, 435 S.E.2d 537, 544
(1993), punitive damages may be available when the breach is accompanied by
identifiable tortious conduct and by some element of aggravation. Dailey v.
Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 57 N.C. App. 346, 291 S.E.2d 331 (1982), appeal after
remand, 75 N.C. App. 387, 331 S.E.2d 148, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 664, 336
S.E.2d 399 (1985) (reinstating a punitive damages award against an insurance
company). Where an insured has alleged that an insurer has acted in bad faith
accompanied by willful and malicious conduct, and such allegations are
supported by specific examples, the insured may have sufficiently alleged a
tortious act if accompanied by the requisite element of "aggravation." Miller, 112
1
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an action for reverse bad faith should be recognized where: (1) an
insured owes his insurer a duty to act in good faith; (2) the insured
in bad faith acts, or fails to act; (3) such bad faith act, or failure to
act, by the insured interferes with the insurer's adjustment, inves-
tigation, defense, or settlement of a claim; and (4) the insurer is
prejudiced by the insured's bad faith conduct.4
I. WHAT DECISIONS HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO
RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REVERSE BAD
FAITH AND FOR WHAT REASONS?
Although legal scholars have addressed arguments both for
and against the adoption of a cause of action for reverse bad faith,5
N.C. App. at 306, 435 S.E.2d at 544. See also Dailey, 57 N.C. App. 346, 291
S.E.2d 331 (1982); Payne v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 67 N.C.
App. 692, 313 S.E.2d 912 (1984). "Aggravation" has been "defined to include
fraud, malice, such a degree of negligence as indicates a reckless indifference to
plaintiff's rights, oppression, insult, rudeness, caprice, and willfulness." Newton
v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976). The
facts and allegations in the insured's complaint must be sufficient to prevent
confusion and surprise to the insurer, but will preclude recovery of punitive
damages for breach of contract where tortious conduct does not accompany the
breach. Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 283 S.E.2d 507 (1981). It is for the trier of
fact to determine whether the alleged facts rise to the level of aggravated conduct
necessary to support a claim for punitive damages. Miller, 112 N.C. App. at 306,
435 S.E.2d at 539 (citing Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 96 N.C. App.
215, 385 S.E.2d 152 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 365, 389 S.E.2d 816
(1990)).
4. See William S. Anderson, Placing a Check on an Insured's Bad Faith
Conduct: The Defense of "Comparative Bad Faith," 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 485, 528
(1994). See also Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's Bad Faith as Shield or Sword:
Litigation Relief for Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 41, 69 (citing George H. Mitchell
& Christopher Robbins, Comparative Bad Faith-"Reverse Bad Faith: When
Should You Make a Claim Against Your Own Insured?, Insurance Claims
Supervision Seminar (Defense Research Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Oct. 29-30, 1992, at
E-24) (arguing that, "an insurer should be able to assert a first-party bad faith
claim against an insured if. (1) the insured knowingly withholds relevant
evidence from the insurer, fabricates or falsifies evidence, or engages in other
fraudulent conduct; or (2) the insured sues the insurer for bad faith without
probable cause, to gain an unfair economic advantage, or for the purpose of
coercing the carrier to pay a disputed claim.").
5. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74 (1994); Richmond, supra note 4; Anderson,
supra note 4; Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas, Comparative and Reverse
Bad Faith: Insured's Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
as Affirmative Defense or Counterclaim, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 215 (1987); John F.
[Vol. 19:43
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to date the number of published decisions applying or citing the
specific term "reverse bad faith" are relatively few.6
Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street?, 62 N.D. L.
REV. 355 (1986).
6. As of the date of research for this article, a Westlaw search using the term
"reverse bad faith" reveals the following cases: Parker v. D'Avolio, 664 N.E.2d
858, 864 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (addressing the concept of reverse bad faith in an
action against a landlord for lead poisoning, and noting, "[ilndeed, case law
suggests, in the context of insurance claims, that courts be vigilant to ensure that
plaintiffs not engage in 'reverse bad faith' conduct"); Johnson v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1995) (declining to adopt a tort of
reverse bad faith under Iowa law); Hanna v. Fleetguard, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1110,
1123, 1129 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (denying plaintiff's motion to remand case to state
court on the grounds that her bad faith claims against her former employer and
its workers' compensation carrier did not arise under the Iowa workers'
compensation statute, and footnoting that Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208, had
rejected recognition of a claim for reverse bad faith under Iowa law); Reedy v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1417, 1435 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (denying
employer's motion for summary judgment on former employee's claims, including
bad faith termination of workers' compensation benefits, and footnoting
Johnson's, 533 N.W.2d 203, rejection of a claim for reverse bad faith under Iowa
law); Snap-on Tools Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., No. 91-1356, 1993 WL 91563, at
*13, *26-27 (Wis. Ct. App., Mar 31, 1993) (Unpublished Disposition) (after a jury
found an insured company acted in bad faith and awarded its insurer $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals found the trial court had committed reversible error in refusing
the insurer's motion for summary judgment because the liability insurance policy
did not provide coverage for the underlying claim, and refused to consider
whether Wisconsin law recognizes a cause of action for reverse bad faith because
the insurer did not assert its counterclaim until after the trial court had
improperly refused the summary judgment motion); Tokles & Son, Inc. v.
Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 945 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to recognize
the tort of reverse bad faith under Ohio law); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern
Indem. Co., No. L-89-395, 1991 WL 355145 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 13, 1991) (finding
that Ohio law does not impose upon an insured a duty to act in good faith in
filing, processing or litigating an insurance claim, the breach of which will give
rise to a cause of action for breach of that duty); Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1190 (Miss. 1990) (affirming jury's award against
insurer of $28,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages
where the record was "replete with evidence evincing 'bad faith-plus ' by the
insurer); Cooper v. Equity Gen. Ins., 268 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of an insurer's amended cross-
complaint which was demurred in part on the grounds that there was no legal
basis for recovery of damages in a reverse bad faith claim); Handal v. U.S.
Fidelity and Guar. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 674 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(recognizing that "a duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy is a
two-way street, running from the insured to his insurer as well as vice versa ....
" [citations omitted] and that "reciprocal duty has been deemed sufficient in an
3
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During its relatively limited history, the concept of "reverse
bad faith" has followed a serpentine path which varies among the
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue.7 To date, the limited
number of jurisdictions which have directly addressed the issue in
published decisions have declined to recognize it as a cause of
action.8 Of the two jurisdictions, Iowa and Ohio, which have
directly addressed the issue and refused to recognize an action for
reverse bad faith against an insured under the law of their respec-
tive states, the reasons cited include: (1) "the insured, who often
finds himself in dire financial straits after the loss, must have the
equal footing which is provided by the ability to sue the insurer for
bad faith;"9 (2) the insurer drafted the policy and can refuse the
insured's claim;1° (3) there are other avenues for the insurer to
appropriate case to support the insurer's affirmative defense of comparative bad
faith in an action brought by the insured."). The court relied on California
Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 822-23 (1985)
(which held that the doctrine of comparative fault should apply in bad faith
cases, reasoning that, "in an appropriate case, an insured's breach of the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing, which contributes to an insurer's failure to
pursue or delay in pursuing the investigation and payment of a claim may
constitute at least a partial defense to the plaintiffs damage action for the
insurer's breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing based on such delay or
failure").
7. Compare Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208
(Iowa 1995) (declining to adopt a tort of reverse bad faith) and Tokles & Son, Inc.
v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 945 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to
recognize the tort of reverse bad faith) with Gendreau v. Foremost Ins. Co., 423
N.W.2d 712, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming award of attorneys' fees
against a party who acted in bad faith, but without specifically addressing the
term "reverse bad faith").
8. See, e.g., Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208; Tokles, 605 N.E.2d at 945. Several
jurisdictions have addressed the application of concepts of "comparative bad
faith" and "comparative fault." These may provide an insurer with a defense to a
bad faith action based upon an insured's comparative bad faith, but would not
provide an insurer an affirmative right of recovery against an insured for
damages suffered by the insurer as a result of the insured's bad faith. For a
discussion of the concepts of comparative fault, comparative bad faith, and cases
addressing the same, and how they differ from the concept of reverse bad faith,
see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 528-33; Richmond, supra note 5. For
additional discussion regarding the application of "comparative bad faith" as a
defense based upon comparative fault by an insured, as opposed to affirmative
attempts by an insurer to recover on a counterclaim for reverse bad faith, see,
e.g., Ellen Smith Pryor, Comparative Fault and Insurance Bad Faith, 72 Tzx. L.
REV. 1505 (1994), and authorities cited therein.
9. Tokles, 605 N.E.2d at 945.
10. Id.
[Vol. 19:43
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pursue in the event that an insured submits a fraudulent claim,
including a cause of action against the insured for fraud;" and (4)
the insurer can have an adequate remedy against an insured who
files a frivolous bad faith claim under a state rule of civil proce-
dure allowing sanctions. 12
Each of the above points invites more persuasive counter-
arguments, particularly in the context of arson and fraud cases.
There are at least13 ten arguments in favor of allowing an insurer
a cause of action for reverse bad faith in first-party actions.
First, an insured who commits arson or fraud often would not
be in such severe "financial straits" if he had not committed the
tortious acts in an attempt to profit from his own wrongdoing.
Second, the fact that an insurer may generally be perceived to
occupy a superior financial position should not tip the scales in an
insured's favor on the issue of reverse bad faith. The matters to be
addressed concern fraud and wrongful conduct, which are factu-
ally and legally irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of relative
bargaining strength. 14
Third, an insurer's purpose in drafting an insurance policy
with express exclusions for wrongful acts of an insured, such as
intentional burning and material misrepresentation, is to exclude
coverage for such acts and prevent the insured from trying to
profit under the policy from his own wrongdoing.
Fourth, the fact that an insurer drafted the policy should not
render it incapable of asserting a reverse bad faith claim against
an insured under the premise that an insurance policy is viewed
as an "adhesion contract." The act of an insured which gives rise
to a reverse bad faith claim is the breach of the duty of good faith.
Good faith is implied by law, and does not directly concern any
clause in the policy which an insured would not have agreed to if
he had equal bargaining power.1 5
Fifth, although an insurer may be able to assert other causes
of action under state law against an insured, such as fraud or
11. Id.
12. Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208.
13. See supra note 3 for additional arguments.
14. For additional discussion regarding courts' assumptions that insurers
occupy a superior financial position, see, e.g., Richmond, supra note 5, at 136.
15. For further discussion concerning courts' perceptions that insurance
policies are "adhesion contracts" under which the parties have unequal
bargaining power, see, e.g., Richmond, supra note 5, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. at
137 (citing Richmond, supra note 4, at 67, and citing Dobbyn, supra note 5, at
372).
1996]
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breach of contract, limiting an insurer to such causes of action
would not afford the insurer an opportunity to seek affirmative
relief for independently actionable bad faith allegations made by
the insured, which should be considered to be compulsory counter-
claims in a bad faith action by an insured.
Sixth, if an insurer were precluded from pursuing a compul-
sory counterclaim that other litigants in the same position would
be able to assert, it would unfairly deny the insurer a legitimate
avenue of recovery under the law simply because it is in the busi-
ness of insurance. 16
Seventh, requiring any causes of action under state law
against the insured, such as fraud or breach of contract, to be pur-
sued by an insurer in a separate action is contrary to the interests
of judicial economy and places an undue burden and increased
financial and time demands upon courts, insurers and insureds. 7
Eighth, sanctions under state rules of civil procedure are cus-
tomarily awarded against a party's attorney, rather than a party
himself. Moreover, courts rarely award sanctions for the full
amount of a party's damages, costs and expenses, including attor-
ney's fees. It is unlikely that an insurer could be made whole with
an award of sanctions without allowing it to pursue an affirmative
counterclaim to recover the full amount of its damages suffered as
a result of the insured's bad faith.
Ninth, if insureds are allowed free reign in pursuing frivolous
bad faith actions against insurers, without any threat that they
will be potentially liable in tort for unjustified and baseless
16. For the observation that previous courts' rejections of a cause of action for
reverse bad faith deprive insurers of a potential compulsory counterclaim for no
reason other than the nature of their business, see, e.g., Richmond, supra note 5,
25 SroN HALL L. REV. 74, at 136 (citing Richmond, supra note 4, at 66). But see
also Kallianos, supra note 1, at 1427-28 (recognizing that because the insurance
industry is affected with a public interest and is frequently regarded as quasi-
public in nature, insurers are often compared to common carriers and public
utilities and are not treated like ordinary commercial businesses but are deemed
to have additional obligations as quasi-public entities and their conduct has been
subject to strict scrutiny by the judiciary).
17. For additional commentary that any judicial preference for more than one
action would unnecessarily burden courts and litigants, see, e.g., Richmond,
supra note 5, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. at 136 (citing Richmond, supra note 4, at
66). See also Dobbyn, supra note 5, at 379 (criticizing courts' historic protection
of all insureds and observing, "until those same courts are willing to recognize
that commercial and industrial insureds do not fit within the stereotype of
'sailors, idiots and infants,' there is scarcely a chance that the law will deal even-
handedly with the two parties to insurance contracts").
[Vol. 19:43
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claims, there is no reason why first-party actions would not rou-
tinely be accompanied by bad faith claims against insurers,
whether or not they are justified.
Tenth, there is little chance that insurers will abuse the sys-
tem if a cause of action for reverse bad faith is recognized. Insur-
ers, ever mindful of the economic bottom line, are unlikely to go to
the increased time, trouble and expense of seeking affirmative
relief unless they have a sufficiently strong case to justify the
same, particularly in light of the fact that courts and juries histor-
ically tend to favor insureds rather than insurers."8
A. Discussion of Published Decisions Which Do Not Specifically
Address a Cause of Action for "Reverse Bad Faith," But
Which Provide Persuasive Reasons Why the
Concept Should be Applied in First-Party Bad
Faith Insurance Litigation
Certain published decisions, which do not specifically address
the propriety of allowing a cause of action for reverse bad faith,
nevertheless provide compelling reasons why the concept of
reverse bad faith should be applied in first-party 9 bad faith insur-
ance litigation.20 This is particularly true in the context of inten-
tional wrongful acts committed by an insured, including
18. For additional observations concerning the traditional preference by
courts and juries in favor of insureds, see, e.g., Richmond, supra note 5, 77 MARQ.
L. REV. at 68, observing that, "[clourts' and juries' perception of insured Davids
versus insurer Goliaths will probably not fade any time soon." See also Dobbyn,
supra note 5, at 379.
19. For a discussion of arguments in favor of allowing insurers a cause of
action for reverse bad faith in third-party cases, see Richmond, supra note 4, at
62-63, 68; see also Dobbyn, supra note 5 (suggesting that a cause of action by an
insurer against an insured is appropriate where an insured's bad faith hindrance
of a settlement ultimately exposes the insurer to increased liability).
20. See, e.g., Gendreau v. Foremost Ins. Co., 423 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (affirming award of attorney's fees on insurer's counterclaim against
insured based upon state statute allowing attorney's fees against a party who
has acted in bad faith, but without specifically addressing the term "reverse bad
faith"). See also RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399 (8th
Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court's entry of summary judgment for insurer on
insured's bad faith claim in employee arson case, but denying summary
judgment on insurer's counterclaim for expenses incurred in investigation and
defense of action, without addressing the propriety of the insurer's counterclaim);
Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[D]uty of good faith between insured and insurer is a reciprocal one...").
1996]
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intentional burning, frequently referred to as arson, 21 and mate-
rial misrepresentation, commonly referred to as fraud.22
In Gendreau v. Foremost Insurance Co.,23 the insurer pro-
vided fire insurance for the insured's trailer and its contents. The
insurance contract contained an exclusion for coverage if the
insured provided false information to the insurer with the intent
21. Although insurance claims which are denied based upon an insured's
intentional burning of his property are commonly referred to as "arson" cases,
they are more correctly referred to as "intentional burning" cases. This is true
because the language of insurance contracts and statutory standard fire
insurance policies in effect in many states, including North Carolina, usually
contains exclusions based upon an insured's direct or indirect participation in the
"intentional burning" of the insured property. The central themes behind a civil
"arson" defense in insurance litigation are similar to those involved in a criminal
arson prosecution. Both require a certain degree of evidence to prove that
someone intentionally burned the property in question. However, civil and
criminal cases have different elements of proof, different burdens of proof, and
different concerns regarding "who done it." In North Carolina, in order to
establish the defense of intentional burning by an insured in a civil action, an
insurer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the insured: (1)
participated directly or indirectly (2) in the intentional burning of the insured
property. Freeman v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 292, 299,
324 S.E.2d 307, 311, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 599, 330 S.E.2d 609 (1985). North
Carolina criminal statutes prohibiting wrongful burning of real and personal
property include, but are not limited to, the following:
§ 14-65. FRAUDULENTLY SETTING FIRE TO DWELLING HOUSES.
If any person, being the occupant of any building used as a dwelling
house, whether such person be the owner thereof or not, or, being the
owner of any building designed or intended as a dwelling house, shall
wantonly and willfully or for a fraudulent purpose set fire to or burn or
cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of such
building, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.
§14-66. BURNING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
If any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn, or
cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of, any goods,
wares, merchandise or other chattels or personal property of any kind,
whether or not the same shall at the time be insured by any person or
corporation against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injure or
prejudice the insurer, the creditor or the person owning the property, or
any other person, whether the property is that of such person or
another, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-65, 14-66 (1993).
22. Insurance claims which are denied on the basis of material
misrepresentation by an insured are often referred to as "insurance fraud" cases.
Many insurance contracts and statutory standard fire insurance policies contain
exclusions based upon an insured's material misrepresentation, fraud or
concealment concerning the insurance policy.
23. 423 N.W.2d at 713.
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to receive benefits to which the insured was not entitled.24 After
a fire destroyed the trailer and its contents, the insured submitted
a claim to the insurer and filed a subsequent action seeking to
recover $16,000 for the loss of his trailer and over $14,000 for the
loss of personal contents within the trailer.25 Although the
insurer acknowledged the insured was entitled to compensation
for the fire damage loss to his trailer, the insurer contended it had
no obligation to pay the insured on the contents claim because the
insured had made fraudulent representations as to his personal
property lost in the fire.26 The insurer counterclaimed against the
insured for its attorney's fees pursuant to a state statute which
allowed recovery for attorney's fees when a party has:
... acted in bad faith; asserted a claim or defense that is frivolous
and that is costly to the other party; asserted an unfounded posi-
tion solely to delay the ordinary course of the proceedings or to
harass; or committed a fraud upon the court.2 7
The jury in Gendreau found that the insured had suffered a
personal property loss in the amount of $4,000, rather than
$14,000, and that the insured had misrepresented facts with an
intent to defraud the insurer as to the nature and extent of his
lOSS. 28 The trial court denied the insured any recovery, after
applying the insurance contract's exclusion of coverage based
upon false information provided to the insurer by the insured with
the intent to receive benefits to which the insured was not enti-
tled.29 The trial court found the insured knew the claim was false
when he made it, as substantiated by the jury verdict.30 After
determining that the insured's filing of an action based upon his
false claim was in bad faith and a waste of valuable court
resources, the court ordered the insured to pay attorney's fees to
the insurer.3 ' On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees, noting
that the jury had found that the insured misrepresented facts
with an intent to defraud the insurer.32 The appellate court
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 714.
28. Id. at 713-14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 714.
1996]
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agreed the fees were properly awarded because the insured had
brought a frivolous claim to court, not because he had previously
made a fraudulent claim to the insurer. 3 Recognizing that the
existence of bad faith is a question of fact best left to the sound
discretion of the court, the appellate court affirmed, finding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's
fees to the insurer.3
4
B. Discussion of Recent Unpublished Decisions from Other
Jurisdictions Which Provide Convincing Reasons Why
Courts Should Recognize a Cause of Action for
Reverse Bad Faith
Recent unpublished decisions from other jurisdictions provide
further persuasive reasons why courts should allow insurers to
assert a counterclaim for reverse bad faith against an insured who
brings a frivolous bad faith claim. 5 One decision which provides
a discussion of the propriety of allowing an insurer recovery on a
counterclaim for bad faith against an arsonist insured is Bernier
v. Allstate Insurance Co.3 6 In Bernier, the State of Connecticut
Superior Court for the Judicial District of Litchfield addressed an
33. Id. The appellate court also rejected the insured's argument that he was
the "prevailing" party on the theory that the jury had awarded him damages of
$4,000. Id. Instead, the court deemed it necessary for the jury to assess the
magnitude of the insured's loss before it could decide whether the claim was
fraudulent. The court found that the jury's conclusion that the insured suffered a
loss of only $4,000 actually supported the insurer's argument that the claim was
fraudulent and therefore the insured was not the "prevailing" party. Id.
34. Id. at 714.
35. For unpublished decisions awarding recovery to an insurer against an
insured, see, e.g., Shahsiah v. Hamilton, No. 153-139061-91 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Tarrant Cty., March 20, 1995) (awarding between $46,000 and $500,000 to each
defendant, including two insurers, for bad faith acts by insured and finding that
alleged auto accident allegedly giving rise to insured's claim never occurred);
Silva v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 92-010830 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty.
1994) (awarding $170,000 to the Employment Security Administration, a plan
administrator for the Durham Life Insurance Company, and to Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, after the jury concluded that the insured defrauded the
companies by misrepresenting her employment and medical history on her
application for medical insurance); Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. United Capital
Ins. Co., No. 91-22014 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. Dec. 30, 1994) (awarding
$241,500 to insurer against insured).
36. No. 056932 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993) (as cited in PROP. INS. L. REV., p. 3955
(October 1993)). Many thanks to the office of Raymond T. DeMeo, Esq., of
Robinson & Cole in Hartford, Connecticut, for kindly providing a copy of the slip
opinion in Bernier.
[Vol. 19:43
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insurer's counterclaim in the context of a bad faith action brought
by two insureds, a grandson and his grandmother, who were co-
owners of a waterfront residence. 7 The action, which initially also
named the insureds' credit union, was brought against the insurer
to recover damages under a fire insurance policy.38 Although the
insurer denied the grandson's claim and defended against the
action on the grounds that he intentionally set the fire, the insurer
paid the grandmother's claims for separate personal property and
damage to the dwelling.39 The only remaining claim was for dam-
age to the grandson's personal property.4 °
In Bernier, the insurer filed a counterclaim against the grand-
son to recover money it paid as result of the fire loss, including
$3,000 for advance living expense paid to the grandson on the day
of the fire, over $85,000 paid to the grandmother (and her attorney
and mortgagees) in settlement of her dwelling and personal prop-
erty claims,4 1 and $7,500 for demolition, and for the insurer's costs
and attorneys fees incurred in investigating and adjusting the
claim and defending against the action.42 After the conclusion of
the grandson's evidence at trial, the court dismissed his claim for
failure to establish a prima facie case, leaving only the insurer's
counterclaim before the court.
The decision in Bernier provides a thorough recitation of the
evidence supporting the insurer's denial of the grandson's claim
and the defense of the ensuing action on the basis of intentional
burning.43 The trial court found that the insurer had clearly met
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Under the law of North Carolina and many other states, when a fire
insurance policy issued to a mortgagor contains a standard loss-payable clause, it
operates as a separate and independent contract insuring the mortgage interest
as between the insurance company and the mortgagee, notwithstanding any
allegations of arson or fraud committed by an insured, and any loss paid by the
insurer must first be applied to the reduction of the mortgage debt. See, e.g.,
Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. British Am. Assurance Co., 259 N.C. 485, 131 S.E.2d
36 (1963); Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
42. Bernier, No. 056932, slip op. at 1-12 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
43. Id. Evidence presented by the insurer at trial included, but was not
limited to, expert testimony regarding low burn patterns and multiple points of
origin, expert opinion testimony that the fire was of human design and was set,
fire debris samples which tested positive for an identifiable accelerant, testimony
that the grandson was the last person at the dwelling and had locked the door
when he left and firefighters had to force entry, inconsistent statements and an
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its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the fire was of incendiary origin." The court also found that
the evidence showed not only that the grandson had the opportu-
nity to set the fire, but also that it would be virtually impossible
for anyone else to have set the fire.45
The court determined that pursuant to the subrogation terms
of the insurance policy and consistent with general insurance law,
the insurer was entitled to recover from the grandson in excess of
$88,000 for the amount of the loss which it paid to the grand-
mother and the mortgagees.46 The court also found that an
implied covenant of good faith applies to a wide variety of contrac-
tual relationships, including insurance contracts.4 7 The court
observed that it is well recognized that the duty of good faith and
fair dealing rested as much on the grandson as it did on the
insurer, and that the grandson's breach of that duty afforded the
insurer a cause of action against him.48 The court reasoned that
in setting fire to the insured premises and in suing the insurer,
the grandson breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing
which arises out of the insurance policy, and that the grandson's
act of arson was an attempt to defraud the insurer.49 The court
further reasoned that in view of the grandson's knowledge that
the fire was set, any losses resulting from the fire were excluded
from the policy and not recoverable. The grandson violated his
duty of good faith and fair dealing by filing suit against the
unsupported alibi offered by the grandson, threats made by the grandson in an
attempt to silence a witness who lived with him at the dwelling, evidence that
the grandson was in dire financial straits at the time of the fire and that the
property was encumbered by mortgages totalling approximately $250,000, an
admission by the grandson that he had submitted falsely inflated tax returns at
his Examination Under Oath during the course of the insurer's investigation,
previous comments by the grandson that he could burn the house down if he
needed money, and evidence negating the grandson's explanation of possible
accidental causes of the fire. Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 10, 12.
46. Id. at 19-20.
47. Id. at 21 (citing pertinent state case law and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt. a (1979), for the proposition that, "[g]ood faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
upon common purpose and consistency with the justified expectation of the other
party..._).
48. Bernier, No. 056932, slip op. at 21.
49. Id. at 22.
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insurer to collect insurance proceeds. 50 The court determined the
insurer was entitled to recover the damages proximately caused
by the necessity of investigating and defending against the grand-
son's claim, including its expenses in investigating the underlying
claim, and all payments made on the claim. 51 The court awarded
the insurer the $3,000 advance payment and payments in excess
of $85,000 made on behalf of the grandmother, and damages
resulting from the breach of the grandson's duty of good faith and
fair dealing by bringing the lawsuit, including attorney's fees and
expenses of almost $69,000 incurred by the insurer in continuing
to defend the action after the grandmother settled her claim and
withdrew from the suit.52
II. IN WHAT SITUATIONS SHOULD THE NORTH CAROLINA
SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
REVERSE BAD FAITH?
In North Carolina, there is currently no published decision
which directly addresses the recognition of a cause of action for
"reverse bad faith." However, North Carolina law does recognize
that a finding of bad faith by an insured is a proper consideration
in the denial of coverage under an insurance policy.53 Bad faith of
the insured is to be measured by a subjective standard, based
upon actual knowledge and an intentional, i.e. purposeful and
knowing, failure by the insured to notify the insurer of the loss;
bad faith is not to be measured by an objective standard based
upon the conduct of a reasonable person. In Tate, the North Caro-
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 22. The court in Bernier also held that in committing his tortious
acts, the grandson committed a separate tort of intentional interference with the
established contractual relationship between the insurer and the grandmother.
Id. at 23. The court reasoned that since the insurance contract relationship
between the insurer and the grandmother was not destroyed by the grandson's
wrongdoing, a contractual relationship still existed and the grandson
intentionally sought to interfere with it by improper or tortious means. Id.
Because the insurer's expenses of performing its obligations under the contract
were greatly increased by the grandson's conduct in setting fire to the property,
the court found the grandson interfered with the contract sufficiently to sustain a
cause of action for interference with the contractual relationship, proximately
causing the insurer to suffer damages, and entitling the insurer to an award of
compensatory damages for the amounts paid on the claim and punitive damages
for its attorneys' fees and costs, plus statutory interest. Id. at 24-25.
53. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 74 N.C. App. 424, 430,
328 S.E.2d 891, rev'd on other grounds, 315 N.C. 714, 340 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
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lina Supreme Court determined, "[w]here a lack of good faith [by
the insured] is found, it is not necessary to determine the issue of
prejudice to the insurer."54 After successive appeals on various
issues, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial
court's findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that the
insured's failure to timely notify its insurer of an accident "lacked
good faith," and therefore the insurer was relieved of its obliga-
tions under the insurance policy.
55
One of the most important points established in Tate is that
coverage may be denied where an insured acts in bad faith, as
judged by a subjective standard, which does not require that the
insured possess a bad motive or a specific ill intent, only that the
insured must have acted, or failed to act, purposefully and know-
ingly. 56 In light of the "bad faith of the insured" language in Tate,
and the fact that no published North Carolina decision has yet
addressed whether North Carolina should recognize a cause of
action for reverse bad faith, the issue can and should be brought to
the attention of the court in an appropriate bad faith action.57
54. Tate, 315 N.C. at 718-19, 340 S.E.2d at 746.
55. Id.
56. Id. Under North Carolina law, the general rule that an insured is not
responsible for false answers in his insurance application where they have been
inserted by his agent through mistake, negligence, or fraud is not absolute, and
applies only if the insured is justifiably ignorant of the untrue answers, has no
actual or implied knowledge thereof, and has been guilty of no bad faith or fraud.
Goodwin v. Investors Life Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 326, 330, 419 S.E.2d 766 (1992). The
issue whether the insured has willfully misrepresented a material fact is
generally for the jury, and mere overvaluation of an insured's claim of loss,
absent a showing of bad faith, does not by itself constitute willful
misrepresentation. Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 61 N.C. App. 365,
370, 301 S.E.2d 439, 442-43, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 678, 304 S.E.2d 759 (1983)
(addressing in part the issue whether the insured's willfulness and bad faith was
conclusively established by his pattern of conduct in exaggerating the value of
the insured building, and citing Lykos v. American Home Ins. Co., 609 F.2d 314
(7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980) (holding that the
evidence established the insured's fraud and false swearing as a matter of law)).
57. This is particularly true because North Carolina is unlike other
jurisdictions which do not expressly recognize a duty of the part of an insured to
act in good faith. See Tokles, 605 N.E.2d at 945 ("Ohio law does not impose upon
an insured a duty to act in good faith in filing, processing or litigating a claim for
insurance, the breach of which will give rise to a cause of action in tort by the
insurer against the insured."). Since North Carolina does impose a duty of good
faith upon an insured, Tate, 74 N.C. App. at 424, 328 S.E.2d at 891, the remedy
for an insured's breach of good faith should be to allow a cause of action in favor
of the insurer for reverse bad faith.
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Although it would not be appropriate in many cases, the recogni-
tion of a cause of action for reverse bad faith would be particularly
justified in cases involving first-party bad faith litigation involving
an intentional burning or material misrepresentation by an
insured.58
III. WHAT POLICY ARGUMENTS PROVIDE COMPELLING REASONS
WHY THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT SHOULD
RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
REVERSE BAD FAITH?
One of the most compelling reasons favoring the recognition
of a cause of action for reverse bad faith is the strong public policy
argument against allowing insureds to profit from their own
wrongdoing while simultaneously subjecting insurers to inordi-
nate increased costs of investigation, defense and litigation. 9
Once an insurer is presented with a fraudulent claim or inten-
tional loss, it must devote an inordinate amount of time, money
and resources to investigating and adjusting the claim, resulting
in escalating insurance costs, all of which unnecessarily increase
the nature and extent of the risk otherwise contemplated under
the policy.60 If the insured further compounds the problem by fil-
ing frivolous bad faith litigation following the denial of his claim,
he further subjects his insurer to unjustified additional expenses
for litigation defense and discovery, causing insurance costs to
skyrocket. Society as a whole would derive financial benefit from
curtailing bad faith claims and frivolous litigation, through
58. It has also been suggested that reverse bad faith should be recognized as
an independent tort where an insured is a sophisticated commercial entity which
enjoys significant bargaining power. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 532 (citing R.
Kent Livesay, Levelling the Playing Field of Insurance Agreements in Texas:
Adopting Comparative Bad Faith as an Affirmative Defense Based on the
Insured's Misconduct, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1201, 1215 (1993)).
59. For further discussion, see, e.g., Richmond, supra note 5, 25 SEToN HALL
L. REV. at 139-40.
60. For additional discussion regarding the increased costs to insurers caused
by bad faith claims and litigation, see Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas,
Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith: Insured's Breach of Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Affirmative Defense or Counterclaim, 23 TORT &
INS. L.J. 215, 225-26 (1987). For additional information regarding the dramatic
increase in bad faith litigation, particularly concerning financial institution
bonds, see Peter C. Haley and Brandt L. Wolkin, Bad Faith and the Financial
Institution Bond, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 715 (1990).
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decreased costs to the insurance industry and resulting lower
insurance premiums.
Although North Carolina has noted certain policy reasons for
allowing adverse consequences against an insurer for its unjusti-
fied and bad faith conduct,6 ' it is also in the public interest to
deter attempts at wrongful financial gain by insureds who have
committed tortious acts in the destruction of insured property or
the presentation of a false or frivolous claim. It has long been rec-
ognized that an insurance company is expected to deal fairly and
in good faith with its policyholders.62 However, the duty of good
faith is a two-way street, which imposes a duty not only on the
insurer, but on the insured as well.6 3 Since the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is a two-way street, imposing the duty not only on
the insurer but also on the insured, the rules of the road should be
equally enforceable against each traveler on that street. The duty
should not be enforced only against the insurer simply because it
is perceived as driving a more powerful vehicle. This is in accord
with the common law principle that implicit in every contract is
the obligation of each party to act in good faith. 4 Public policy
concerns dictate against encouraging attempts by insureds to
61. See, e.g., Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.C. App. 355, 359,
273 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280 S.E.2d 454 (1981) ("because of the
great disparity of financial resources which generally exists between insurer and
insured and the fact that insurance companies, like common carriers and
utilities, are regulated and clearly affected with a public interest, we recognize
the wisdom of a rule which would deter refusals on the part of insurers to pay
valid claims when the refusals are both unjustified and in bad faith"); Newton v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 116, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1976) (stating the
rule). For further discussion of policy reasons supporting first-party bad faith
claims against insurers, see, e.g., Kallianos, supra note 1.
62. Miller, 112 N.C. App. at 306, 435 S.E.2d at 545 (citing Robinson v. North
Carolina Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 86 N.C. App. 44, 50, 356 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1987),
disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 592, 364 S.E.2d 140 (1988)).
63. See, e.g., Tate, 315 N.C. at 714, 340 S.E.2d at 243 (recognizing an
insured's duty to act in good faith); Handal, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 696-97
(recognizing that the "duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy is
a two-way street, running from the insured to his insurer as well as vice versa").
See also Anderson, supra note 4, at 486 (noting that in recent years several
courts have held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a "two-way street,"
and citing Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d
1038, 1041 (Cal. 1980)); Richmond, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that if the duty
of good faith and fair dealing is truly a "two way street," then, "[w]ith mutual
duties should come mutual remedies").
64. Great Am. Ins. Co., 303 N.C. at 399 (citing 17 AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts, §256
(1964)).
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profit from their wrongdoing, and fully justify allowing insurers to
apply the concept of reverse bad faith in first-party actions to
"turn the shield into a sword"65 by seeking affirmative relief
against their insureds.
IV. UNTIL THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REVERSE BAD FAITH, WHAT
REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO FIGHT AGAINST A
FRAUDULENT FIRST-PARTY CLAIM OR
BAD FAITH CLAIM PRESENTED BY AN INSURED?
A. Key Policy Exclusions and Conditions
In the context of insurance coverage determinations, various
policy conditions and exclusions are available to an insurer to
evaluate coverage in a claim involving intentional burning, fraud
or material misrepresentation. Most policies contain certain
stated Exclusions and Conditions which provide contractual
grounds for an insurer to fight against an intentional loss or
fraudulent insurance claim, with language similar to the
following:
CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD
The entire policy will be void if, whether before or after a loss, an
insured has:
a) intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance;66
b) engaged in fraudulent conduct; or
c) made false statements; relating to this insurance.
Some standard form policy terms exclude coverage for the
following:
65. See Richmond, supra note 4, at 61-70; Anderson, supra note 4, at 528-33.
See also Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 5; Dobbyn, supra note 5.
66. It has been held that to prevail on an affirmative defense of
misrepresentation and void a fire insurance policy, an insurer must prove that
the insured knowingly and willfully made statements that were false and
material. Harris v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 91 N.C. App. 147,
370 S.E.2d 700 (1988); Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362,
329 S.E.2d 333 (1985). However, it has also been held that an insured who signs
an application for insurance adopts it as his statement, and the fact that he may
have made a misrepresentation unknowingly does not, in the absence of bad
faith on the part of the insurer or its agent, alter the effect of the
misrepresentation. Pittman v. First Protection Life Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 428,
325 S.E.2d 287, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985), affd, 79 N.C.
App. 431, 339 S.E.2d 441, cert. denied, 316 N.C. 733, 345 S.E.2d 391 (1986).
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(1) INTENTIoNAL Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act
committed:
a) by or at the direction of the insured; and
b) with the intent to cause a loss;
(2) NEGLECT, meaning neglect of the insured to use all reasonable
means to save and preserve property at and after the time of
the loss; and
(3) INCREASING THE HAZARD, which excludes coverage for any acts
by the insured which increase the hazard or risk to the insured
property.
Of additional importance are certain stated policy Conditions
which specify the insured's Duties After Loss. The Duties After
Loss require a level of cooperation by the insured which is concom-
itant with the insurer's contractual and statutory obligations to
conduct a prompt and reasonable investigation, evaluation and
adjustment of the insured's claim.67 Some of the most important
Duties After Loss include the submission of the Proof of Loss form
and supporting Contents Inventory. The Duties After Loss also
require the insured to cooperate in the investigation and handling
of the loss, usually by requiring that as often as the insurance
company may reasonably require an insured must:68
(1) show the damaged property;
(2) provide the insurance company with requested records and
documents and permit them to make copies;6 9 and
67. For a discussion of the significance of the insured's duty to cooperate in his
Duties After Loss, see Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 60, at 227-28.
68. See also lines 113 through 116 of the "Standard 165 Lines" discussed
supra in text pp. 28-30 and incorporated into N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994),
which provides in part:
... The insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to
any person designated by this Company all that remains of any property
herein described, and submit to examinations under oath by any person
named by this Company, and subscribe the same; and, as often as may
be reasonably required, shall produce for examination all books of
account, bills, invoices and other vouchers, or certified copies thereof if
originals be lost, at such reasonable time and place as may be
designated by this Company or its representatives, and shall permit
extracts and copies thereof to be made.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994). Further discussion of the "Standard 165
Lines" incorporated into N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994), is contained within
the following footnotes.
69. Although the financial condition of the insured is relevant to an arson
defense, the statutory "production of documents" clause in the standard fire
insurance policy does not expressly authorize an insurer's unlimited access to
any and all of an insured's business and financial records. Chavis v. State Farm
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(3) submit to an Examination Under Oath, while not in the pres-
ence of any other insured and sign the same.70
B. "Standard 165 Lines" of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy
In North Carolina, and most other states, in addition to the
language set forth in the insurance contract, there is a form stat-
ute setting forth the "Standard 165 Lines" of the Standard Fire
Insurance Policy, which by statute is automatically written into
every fire insurance policy issued in North Carolina for property
in this state.7 ' The language of the "Standard 165 lines" incorpo-
rated into §58-44-15 of the North Carolina General Statutes, is
broad enough not only to deny an insurance claim where the
insured participated directly or indirectly in the intentional burn-
Fire & Cas. Co., 317 N.C. 683, 687, 346 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1986). The provision in
the statutory standard fire insurance policy expressly provides that the insured
shall produce for examination "all books of account, bills, invoices, and other
vouchers." Id. (citing Lines 113-116, N.C. GEN. STAT. §58-44-15 (1994)). It has
been held that the language of the statutory provision assumes that the insurer's
requests for documents will be reasonable and will relate to the insured property.
Chavis, 317 N.C. at 687-88, 346 S.E.2d at 498. The provision does not grant an
insurer an unlimited right to roam at will through all of an insured's financial
records, without the restriction of reasonableness and specificity. Id.
Compliance with policy provisions requiring an insured to produce documents
"as often as may be reasonably required" at a "reasonable time and place" is a
condition precedent to bringing suit where an insurer notifies its insured of the
time and place for production. The "reasonable time and place" clause ordinarily
means that a demand must be made within a reasonable period of time and that
the location must be in the locality of the insured property. Chavis, 79 N.C. App.
at 216, 338 S.E.2d at 789, rev'd on other grounds, 317 N.C. 683, 346 S.E.2d 496
(1986).
70. An insured can be barred from recovery under an insurance policy for
failing to submit to an Examination Under Oath. Fineberg v. State Farm, 113
N.C. App. 545, 548, 438 S.E.2d 754, 755, cert. denied, 336 N.C. 315, 445 S.E.2d
395 (1994). Where an insured was reasonably requested by an insurer to submit
to an Examination Under Oath before suit was fied, but she refused to do so, her
later willingness to be examined after she filed suit did not satisfy her duty
under the policy and her suit was properly dismissed. Baker v. Independent Fire
Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 521, 522, 405 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1991).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15(c) and § 58-44-20 (1994). See Star Varifoam
Corp. of Am. v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 64 N.C. App. 306, 307 S.E.2d 194 (1983),
cert. denied, 310 N.C. 154, 311 S.E.2d 294 (1984) (the statutory standard fire
insurance policy is incorporated into every policy of fire insurance issued in
North Carolina). In case of conflict between the insurance contract and the
standard fire insurance policy, the standard policy provisions set forth in § 58-44-
15 should prevail. Buckner v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 640, 184 S.E.
520 (1936).
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ing, but also where the insured is involved in other types of willful
concealment, misrepresentation, fraud or false swearing.72
The language of the "Standard 165 Lines" also expressly pro-
vides an insurer with a right of subrogation against a tortfeasor to
the extent of payment on a loss through the following provisions:
Lines 162 through 165:
SUBROGATION. This company may require from the insured an
assignment of all right of recovery against any party for loss to the
extent that payment therefor is made by this company.
Lines 78 through 83:
If this Company shall claim that no liability existed as to the mort-
gagor or owner, it shall, to the extent of payment of loss to the
[designated] mortgagee, be subrogated to all the mortgagee's
rights of recovery, but without impairing mortgagee's right to sue,
or it may pay off the mortgage debt and require an assignment
thereof and of the mortgage.73
In addition to the terms automatically incorporated into each
policy under § 58-44-15, almost all fire insurance contracts con-
tain policy language similar to the subrogation provisions set forth
above. The clause in the standard fire insurance policy which pro-
vides that the insured shall not collect "in any event for more than
the interest of the insured" limits a mortgagee's interest to the
amount of the mortgage debt outstanding at the time of the fire.7 4
72. Some of the most pertinent provisions of the "Standard 165 Lines"
incorporated within N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994), include the following:
Lines 1 through 6:
CONCEALMENT, FRAUD. This entire policy shall be void if, whether before
or after a loss, the insured has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject
thereof, or the interest of the insured therein, or in case of any fraud or
false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
Lines 11 through 13, and 21 through 24:
PERILS NOT INCLUDED. This Company shall not be liable for loss by fire or
other perils insured against in this policy caused, directly or indirectly,
by: ... (i) neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and
preserve the property at and after a loss, or when the property is
endangered by fire in neighboring premises...
Lines 28 through 32:
CONDITIONS SUSPENDING OR RESTRICTING INSURANCE. Unless otherwise
provided in writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for
loss occurring: (a) while the hazard in increased by any means within
the control or knowledge of the insured; ...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44-15 (1994).
74. Employers' Fire, 259 N.C. 485, 131 S.E.2d 36.
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C. Declaration of the Rights and Obligations of Parties to the
Insurance Contract
Under Rule 57, North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, an
insurance company may bring a declaratory judgment action, by
filing a lawsuit naming the insured, to define the rights and duties
of the parties under an insurance policy.76 Under Federal law, the
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2201, shall be in accordance with Rule 57 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A declaratory judgment action enables
an insurance company to take the first affirmative step to show its
good faith in requesting the court to declare the rights of the par-
ties concerning coverage issues, rather than having to wait to be
sued for any alleged breach of contract or bad faith claims which
may arise from the insurer's denial of coverage. Under Rules 38
and 39 of the Federal and North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, an insurance company may demand a trial by jury.7 6
D. Statutory Provisions Allowing Recovery of Attorneys Fees
Section 1D-45, North Carolina General Statutes, allows for an
award of attorney's fees as follows:
FRIVOLOUS OR MALICIOUS ACTIONS; ATTORNEYS' FEES
The court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees, resulting from
the defense against the punitive damages claim, against a claim-
ant who files a claim for punitive damages that the claimant
knows or should have known to be frivolous or malicious. The
court shall award reasonable attorney fees against a defendant
who asserts a defense in a punitive damages claim that the
defendant knows or should have known to be frivolous or
malicious. 77
Nothing in § 1D-45 indicates it would be unavailable to support an
award of attorney's fees in favor of an insurer in the defense of a
frivolous bad faith action.
E. Rules of Civil Procedure Allowing Sanctions
Under Rule 11, North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court may award sanctions against an attorney or party who signs
any pleading, motion or other paper in violation of the rule, which
requires that such documents be well grounded in fact and sub-
75. N.C.R. Civ. P. 57.
76. N.C.R. Civ. P. 38 & 39.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-45 (1995).
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mitted in good faith.78 Other jurisdictions have suggested that
sanctions under such a rule be awarded when an insured brings a
frivolous action or bad faith claim.79 However, as previously
noted, since courts do not customarily award sanctions for the full
amount of a party's damages, costs and expenses, including attor-
ney's fees, it is doubtful that an insurer facing a frivolous bad faith
claim could be made whole with an award of sanctions, without
allowing it to pursue full recovery of its damages through an
affirmative counterclaim for reverse bad faith.
F. Statute Allowing Post-Conviction Recovery for Insurance
Fraud
Beginning October 1, 1995, under § 58-2-161 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, once there has been a criminal convic-
tion of the insured, for violations occurring on or after that date,
an insurer may bring a civil action to recover compensatory dam-
ages, attorneys' fees, costs, reasonable investigative costs and,
where appropriate, treble damages, based upon an insured's false
statement to procure benefits under an insurance policy.80 How-
78. Rule 11 states in relevant part:
... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.... If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
79. See, e.g., Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208 (addressing Iowa's Rule 80(a)
allowing attorney's fees as sanctions).
80. That section provides in part:
§58-2-161. FALSE STATEMENT TO PROCURE OR DENY BENEFIT OF
INSURANCE POLICY OR CERTIFICATE.
(b) Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive an
insurer or insurance claimant:
(1) Presents or causes to be presented a written or oral statement,
including computer-generated documents as part of, in support of, or in
opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an
[Vol. 19:43
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ever, because §58-2-161 only provides relief to an insurer after
there has already been a criminal conviction in a separate pro-
ceeding, the need for relief in the nature of a counterclaim for
reverse bad faith still remains.
V. CAVEAT: IN CASES INVOLVING THE INNOCENT SPOUSE
DOCTRINE, ANY REVERSE BAD FAITH CLAIM MUST BE
DIRECTED ONLY AGAINST THE
WRONGDOER SPOUSE.
Many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, currently rec-
ognize the "innocent spouse" doctrine, which allows recovery of a
share of insurance proceeds by an insured spouse who did not par-
ticipate directly or indirectly in the intentional burning, even
though the fire loss resulted from an intentional burning by the
guilty spouse."' Despite any limitations presented by an innocent
spouse situation, an insurer should still be entitled to assert a
insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains false or
misleading information concerning any fact or matter material to the
claim, or
(2) Assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another person to prepare or
make any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to
an insurer or insurance claimant in connection with, in support of, or in
opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an
insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains false or
misleading information concerning a fact or matter material to the claim
is guilty of a Class H felony. Each claim shall be considered a separate
count. Upon conviction, if the court imposes probation, the court may
order the defendant to pay restitution as a condition of probation. In
determination of the amount of restitution pursuant to G.S. 15A-
1343(d), the reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the victim
in the investigation of, and efforts to recover damages arising from, the
claim, may be considered part of the damage caused by the defendant
arising out of the offense.
In a civil cause of action for recovery based upon a claim for which a
defendant has been convicted under this section, the conviction may be
entered into evidence against the defendant. The court may award the
prevailing party compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and
reasonable investigative costs. If the prevailing party can demonstrate
that the defendant has engaged in a pattern of violations of this section,
the court may award treble damages.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §58-2-161 (1994).
81. See, e.g., Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 302 N.C. 150, 152, 274 S.E,2d
170 (1981) (citing Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 307 A.2d 142 (N.J. Super. 1973),
affd, 327 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)), and other cases cited by
Lovell, 302 N.C. at 152 n.1, 274 S.E.2d at 170 n.1, which allow recovery by an
innocent spouse.
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claim for reverse bad faith against a guilty spouse for recovery of
amounts paid by the insurer to any innocent co-insureds, mortga-
gees or lienholders for damages to real or personal property, for
recovery of the insurer's expenses incurred in the investigation of
the underlying claim, for advance payments and additional living
expenses, for costs of clean up, repair, demolition, and debris
removal, and for attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending
against any litigation arising from the insured's claim.82
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the law of North Carolina and most other states, there
is currently no recognized cause of action for reverse bad faith to
protect insurers against insureds' tortious acts, fraudulent claims
and frivolous bad faith litigation. Unless and until courts adopt
the tort of reverse bad faith, there will be little disincentive for an
insured to file a fraudulent claim for frivolous bad faith litigation.
With the recent proliferation of bad faith lawsuits, there is an
increasing need for courts to "even up the scales" so that in appro-
priate circumstances an insurer may respond to unjustified bad
faith allegations with a bad faith counterclaim against the
insured. The arguments in favor of recognizing a claim for reverse
bad faith are particularly compelling in the areas of arson and
insurance fraud, where public policy considerations dictate
against allowing an insured to profit from his own wrongdoing.
The time has come to recognize a cause of action for reverse bad
faith and allow insurers to fight fire with fire.
82. See, e.g., Bernier v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 056932 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)
(allowing such recovery against the insured tortfeasor based upon state statutory
provisions).
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